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KEEPING THE BARBARIANS AT THE GATES: 
THE PROMISE OF THE UNESCO AND 




Videos of Islamic State militants brutally smashing ancient statues and 
carvings at ruins and museums across Iraq and Syria made headlines around 
the world.
1
But while this active, iconoclastic destruction made front-page 
news, another form of cultural property destruction has remained in the 
shadows: the illicit trade in cultural property.
2
This trade removes cultural 
property from its country of origin to be hidden in private collections, re-
moving parts of a country’s history and destroying the public’s ability to en-
joy and benefit from that property.
Although the danger of trafficking in cultural property can be quite ex-
treme even in highly industrialized countries,
3
the problem is more acute in 
developing countries that are rich in cultural property but poor economical-
ly.
4
With fewer resources to dedicate to patrolling the movement of cultural 
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1. E.g., A. R. Williams, ISIS Smashes Priceless, Ancient Statues in Iraq, NAT’L 
GEOGRAPHIC (Feb. 27, 2015), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/news/2015/2/150227-
islamic-militants-destroy-statues-mosul-iraq-video-archaeology.
2. See Benoit Faucon, Georgi Kantchev & Alistair MacDonald, The Men Who Trade 
ISIS Loot, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 6, 2017, 7:28 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-men-who-
trade-isis-loot-1502017200.
3. See, e.g., Sue J. Park, Note, The Cultural Property Regime in Italy: An Industrial-
ized Source Nation’s Difficulties in Retaining and Recovering Its Antiquities, 23 U. PA. J.
INT’L ECON. L. 931, 935 (1994).
4. See PERNILLE ASKERUD & ETIENNE CLÉMENT, PREVENTING THE ILLICIT TRAFFIC 
IN CULTURAL PROPERTY: A RESOURCE HANDBOOK FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION FOR THE 
1970 UNESCO CONVENTION 10, 14, 44 (1997); Brigitta Hauser-Schäublin & Sophorn Kim, 
Faked Biographies: The Remake of Antiquities and Their Sale on the Art Market, in 
CULTURAL PROPERTY AND CONTESTED OWNERSHIP: THE TRAFFICKING OF ARTEFACTS AND 
THE QUEST FOR RESTITUTION 108, 111 (Brigitta Hauser-Schäublin and Lyndel V. Prott eds., 
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property inside their borders, developing countries are at a greater risk of 
losing that property.
5
In addition, criminal and terrorist networks such as the 
Islamic State have stolen or unearthed cultural property and then used it to 
fund their activities.
6
Therefore the illicit cultural property trade is an espe-
cially dangerous problem for developing countries since they often have 
both large amounts of cultural property and a lack of resources to protect 
them.
7
While some legal scholars have suggested creating a new treaty to 
protect cultural property in developing countries,
8
this note instead argues 
that we should first look to two existing, but underutilized, treaties on cul-
tural property protection to create a cooperative international defense of 
global cultural property.
This note proceeds as follows. After this introduction, Part II enumer-
ates the benefits of keeping cultural property in its home state, including de-
veloping the home state’s tourism industry, preserving its national identity, 
and countering criminal groups that take advantage of the illicit cultural 
property trade. It then evaluates how poor economic conditions in develop-
ing countries set up a dichotomy between state and non-state actors using 
cultural property for cash or development: The allure of cash is a potent 
force, especially when developing countries may lack the resources at pre-
sent to patrol their own borders, but, once sold, the future value of cultural 
property to the local economy is lost.
Part III evaluates alternatives proposed in the literature to deal with traf-
ficking in cultural property. Part IV then looks at how ratification of exist-
ing conventions on cultural property, namely the United Nations Education-
al, Scientific and Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”)
9
and the United 
Nations International Institute for the Unification of Private Law 
(“UNIDROIT”)
10
Conventions, could offer ready solutions for protecting 
2016); John Henry Merryman, What Do Matisse, Van Gogh, and Hitler Have in Common?,
U.B.C. L. REV. 273, 274 (1995). 
5. See Donna Yates, Reality and Practicality: Challenges to Effective Cultural Prop-
erty Policy on the Ground in Latin America, 22 INT’L J. CULT. PROP. 337, 350 (2015). 
6. See Faucon, Kantchev & MacDonald, supra note 2.
7. ASKERUD & CLÉMENT, supra note 4, at 9.
8. See, e.g., Edward Cottrell, Note, Keeping the Barbarians Outside the Gate: Toward 
a Comprehensive International Agreement Protecting Cultural Property, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L.
627, 648 (2009); Zsuzsanna Veres, Note, The Fight Against Illicit Trafficking of Cultural 
Property: The 1970 UNESCO Convention and the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, 12 SANTA 
CLARA J. INT’L L. 91, 111–13 (2014).
9. United Nations Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit 
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 
231 [hereinafter UNESCO Convention]. 
10. United Nations International Institute for the Unification of Private Law 
[“UNIDROIT”] Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, June 24, 1995, 
2421 U.N.T.S. 457 [hereinafter UNIDROIT Convention].
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the interests of developing countries by establishing market country
11
pro-
tection obligations while limiting source country financial obligations. It re-
views the Conventions’ mechanics, their benefits, and their shortcomings, 
ultimately determining that the advantages of invoking the Conventions 
outweigh the detriments of doing so. Part V concludes that while other al-
ternatives do exist, the Conventions are underappreciated existing remedies 
that are calibrated to help developing countries—and therefore may be a 
more efficient solution to trafficking in cultural property than the invention 
of a new treaty. Greater state ratification of the UNESCO and UNIDROIT 
Conventions is a promising and underutilized option for developing coun-
tries to better protect their cultural property.
II.  What Is the Illicit Cultural Property Trade?
In general, cultural property refers to all “movable or immovable prop-
erty of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people.”
12
It can 
include a wide range of objects, including art or artifacts, or even architec-
ture.
13
For example, Roman floor mosaics are a form of cultural property 
that has been sold extensively on the black market,
14
as are the decorative 
gold leaves stolen from an iconic roof.
15
The illicit trade in cultural property 
is the global phenomenon of selling cultural property through smuggling 
and black markets.
16
11. Market countries are those countries with the most purchasers of cultural property, 
compared to source countries that are the net exporters of cultural property. The United States 
is a prime example of the former and Greece and Egypt of the latter. See Carol A. Roeh-
renbeck, Repatriation of Cultural Property—Who Owns the Past? An Introduction to Ap-
proaches and to Selected Statutory Instruments, 38 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 185, 189 (2010). 
12. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 
with Regulations for the Execution of the Convention 1954 art. 1, May 14, 1954, 249 
U.N.T.S. 215 [hereinafter Hague Convention]. The Hague Convention predates the UNESCO 
Convention and does not provide as broad of a definition for cultural property, but it is helpful 
for understanding the core spirit of the term. The full definition used by the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”) can be found in article 1 of 
the UNESCO Convention, supra note 9. 
13. Hague Convention, supra note 12.
14. Steve Swann, Antiquities Looted in Syria and Iraq Are Sold on Facebook, BBC
NEWS (May 2, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-47628369.
15. Golden Leaves Stolen from the Dome of Vienna’s Succession Building, ARTFORUM
(Apr. 27, 2018, 6:30 AM), https://www.artforum.com/news/golden-leaves-stolen-from-the-
dome-of-vienna-s-secession-building-75159.
16. See generally Peter B. Campbell, The Illicit Antiquities Trade as a Transnational 
Criminal Network: Characterizing and Anticipating Trafficking of Cultural Heritage, 20 
INT’L J. CULT. PROP. 113 (2013) (describing the illicit antiquities market). 
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A. How Has the Illicit Trade in Cultural Property Developed?
Technology and globalization have significantly contributed to the ex-
pansion of the illicit antiquities trade over the past forty years.
17
A century 
ago, international collectors were limited by financial and geographic access 
to property and by merchants’ interest in selling such things.
18
Today, the 
scope of the cultural property trade is global, both in terms of the buyers for 
and origins of targeted acquisitions,
19
with complex smuggling trains allow-
ing illicit cultural property to travel far and wide.
20
The scale of cultural 
property crime is one of the greatest among criminal activities worldwide.
21
Whether it is their symbolism, history, exoticism, or simply their rarity, arti-
cles of cultural property are valued commodities and have a ready market:
22
The art and cultural property market is valued at billions of dollars a year.
23
17. Neil Brodie, An Archaeologist’s View of the Trade in Unprovenanced Antiquities,
in ART AND CULTURAL HERITAGE: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE 52, 52 (Barbara Hoffman 
ed., 2006).
18. See, e.g., Louise Tythacott, Curiosities, Antiquities, Art Treasure, Commodities: 
Collecting Chinese Deity Figures in Mid-Nineteenth-Century England, 23 J. MUSEUM 
ETHNOGRAPHY 56, 65 (2010). As an additional example, around the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury, elite Europeans tended to gravitate toward antiquities from classical Europe and the an-
cient Middle East. See Jean Sorabella, The Grand Tour, MET. MUSEUM (Oct. 2003), 
https://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/grtr/hd_grtr.htm (describing the fascination of young 
European gentlemen with classical antiquities during the Grand Tour from the sixteenth to the 
nineteenth centuries); Geoff Emberling, Passport to Antiquity, ARCHEOLOGY (July 1, 2010), 
https://archive.archaeology.org/online/features/breasted (describing the Middle East collecting 
tour of the United States’ first Egyptologist, James Henry Breasted, from 1919 to 1920).
19. See, e.g., Benjamin W. Kankpeyeng & Christopher R. DeCorse, Ghana’s Vanishing 
Past: Development, Antiquities, and the Destruction of the Archaeological Record, 21 AFR.
ARCHAEOLOGICAL REV. 89, 92 (2004) (citing the increased sale of antiquities to tourists, 
which in turn has triggered more local looting of archaeological sites); Ralph Blumenthal & 
Tom Mashberg, Officials Are Set to Seize Antiquity, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/05/arts/design/ancient-cambodian-statue-is-seized-from-
sothebys.html (describing the seizure of a stolen Cambodian statute from Sotheby’s, valued at 
$2 to $3 million USD).
20. See Campbell, supra note 16, at 116–20 (explaining that the illicit antiquities trade 
involves a variety of ever-changing actors, from local diggers to sophisticated end-dealers). 
See generally Donna Yates, The Global Traffic in Looted Cultural Objects, in OXFORD 
RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINOLOGY (2016) (analyzing the illicit cultural trafficking 
chain). 
21. UNESCO Press Release, 40 Years of Fighting the Illicit Trafficking of Cultural 
Goods (Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.unesco.org/new/en/media-services/single-view/news/40_
years_of_fighting_the_illicit_trafficking_of_cultural_goo.
22. See Arjo Klamer, Cultural Goods Are Good for More than Their Economic Value,
in CULTURE AND PUBLIC ACTION 138, 155–56 (Vijayendra Rao & Michael Walton eds., 
2004). 
23. See Valentina Vadi & Hildegard Schneider, Art, Cultural Heritage and the Market: 
Legal and Ethical Issues, in ART, CULTURAL HERITAGE AND THE MARKET: ETHICAL AND 
LEGAL ISSUES 1, 8–9 (Valentina Vadi & Hildegard Schneider eds., 2014); see also UNESCO 
Inst. for Statistics, International Flows of Selected Cultural Goods and Services, 1994–2003: 
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And where there is a market, there are incentives to those with access to 
sell.
Especially in developing countries where cultural property is not se-
cured in guarded institutions, cultural property is readily accessible to lo-
cals, some of whom know that they can sell these artifacts and make enough 
money to eke out a living or provide food for their families.
24
These “sub-
sistence diggers” typically find and sell antiquities because they see few 
other avenues by which to improve their standard of living.
25
Like their citizens, states can also play a role in the loss of cultural 
property: They can turn a blind eye to the sale of cultural property, be com-
plicit in its sale, or simply not have the resources to properly protect it. Do-
mestic regulation of cultural property sales can vary wildly,
26
although the 
UNESCO Convention does require its signatories to have baseline protec-
Defining and Capturing the Flows of Global Cultural Trade 19–22 (2005) (describing the in-
crease in global trade in cultural goods from $38 to $60 billion USD between 1994 and 2003).
24. See Janet Ulph, The Trade in Art and Antiquities, in THE ILLICIT TRADE IN ART 
AND ANTIQUITIES: INTERNATIONAL RECOVERY AND CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILITY 1, 11 
(Janet Ulph & Ian Smith eds., 2012); see, e.g., Simon Mackenzie & Tess Davis, Temple Loot-
ing in Cambodia: Anatomy of a Statue Trafficking Network, 54 BRIT. J. CRIMINOL. 722, 729, 
732 (2014) (describing the creation of military and non-military gangs inside Cambodia cen-
tered on trading Khmer artifacts); Joshua Hammer, Looting Mali’s History, SMITHSONIAN 
(Nov. 2009), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/travel/looting-malis-history-144953243 (dis-
cussing the relationship between the robust sale of antiquities in Mali—despite Malian antiq-
uities regulations—and endemic poverty in the region). 
25. See Morag Kersel, From the Ground to the Buyer: A Market Analysis of the Trade 
in Illegal Antiquities, in ARCHAEOLOGY, CULTURAL HERITAGE AND THE ANTIQUITIES 
TRADE 188, 190, 199 (Neil Brodie et al. eds., 2006). For example, in Greece, until recently 
wracked by a severe economic crisis, some people took to stealing and selling antiquities for 
quick cash. Nick Romeo, Strapped for Cash, Some Greeks Turn to Ancient Source of Wealth,
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Aug. 17, 2015), https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2015/08/150817-
greece-looting-artifacts-financial-crisis-archaeology. Impoverished peasants in Peru have 
looted sites to afford food. Nathaniel C. Nash, Poor Peru Stands By as Its Rich Past Is Plun-
dered, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 1993), https://www.nytimes.com/1993/08/25/world/poor-peru-
stands-by-as-its-rich-past-is-plundered.html. Likewise, by selling antiquities, poor farmers in 
Nigeria make double what they do farming yams. See Aisha Labi & Simon Robinson, Looting 
Africa: Theft, Illicit Sales, Poverty and War Are Conspiring to Rob a Continent of Its Rich 
Artistic Heritage, TIME (Aug. 6, 2001), http://content.time.com/time/world/article/
0,8599,2056125,00.html.
And although the phrase “subsistence diggers” suggests that all looting of this kind happens 
on land, some happens at sea. Underwater cultural heritage is covered by the 2001 UNESCO 
Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage rather than the 1970 
UNESCO Convention, but the same economic incentives apply. See, e.g., Mai Lin Tjoa-
Bonatz, Struggles Over Historic Shipwrecks in Indonesia: Economic Versus Preservation In-
terests, in CULTURAL PROPERTY AND CONTESTED OWNERSHIP: THE TRAFFICKING OF 
ARTEFACTS AND THE QUEST FOR RESTITUTION 85, 87 (Brigitta Hauser-Schäublin & Lyndel 
V. Prott eds., 2016) (discussing how Indonesian fishermen have strong economic incentives to 
recover and sell cultural heritage recovered from shipwrecks).
26. For example, Europe is considered to have less stringent requirements for proving 
provenance than the United States. See William G. Pearlstein, Buying and Selling Antiquities 
in Today’s Market, SPENCER’S ART L.J., Spring 2012.
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tions in their domestic regulations.
27
But because the crime of selling cultur-
al property usually requires the property to leave its home country, it is nec-
essary to not just have domestic regulation, but international regulation that 
can lead to the recovery of cultural property once it has left its home coun-
try. Some regulatory protections of this kind can be found in bilateral 
agreements
28
and the restrictions of importing countries.
29
Additional forms 
of international protection will be addressed in Part IV.
B. Why Should a Country Protect Its Cultural Property?
Although state and non-state actors in source countries might benefit 
from selling pieces of their cultural property, these benefits tend to be short-
term and superficial. The local community as a whole barely benefits from 
the sale of a state’s cultural property. In fact, in many cases, the local seller 
of an artifact only receives less than one percent of its retail value, with 
most of the profit going to middlemen in the trade.
30
Moreover, the antiqui-
ties market is not sustainable. Unlike other aspects of cultural heritage, such 
as traditional craftsmanship techniques that can be preserved and furthered 
through the creation of cultural heritage-based industries,
31
once physical 
properties are gone, their home countries are left without that resource for 
future economic development. Lastly, the cash generated by the sale of cul-
tural property often goes to criminals or military warlords, rather than into 
the local economy.
32
In contrast, the retention of cultural property can spur economic growth 
through tourism, provide a sense of cultural identity, and dry up a funding 
source for extremists and criminal groups.
27. See UNESCO Convention, supra note 9, arts. 5–10, 13–14.
28. See, e.g., Agreement for the Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Histor-
ical and Cultural Property, May 21, 1984, U.S.-Guatemala, T.I.A.S. No 11077 (the parties 
agreed, inter alia, “to deter illicit excavations of archaeological sites and the theft of archaeo-
logical, historical or cultural properties”); Treaty of Cooperation Providing for the Recovery 
and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historical and Cultural Properties, July 17, 1970, U.S.-
Mexico, 22 U.S.T. 494, T.I.A.S. No. 7088 (using the same language).
29. See Pearlstein, supra note 26 (noting differing restriction standards in, for example, 
the United States and Europe).
30. Lisa J. Borodkin, Note, The Economics of Antiquities Looting and a Proposed Le-
gal Alternative, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 378 (1995). 
31. See generally Ummu Hani et al., Preserving Cultural Heritage Through Creative 
Industry: A Lesson from Saung Angklung, 4 PROCEDIA ECON. & FIN. 193 (2012) (analyzing 
the Saung Angklung Udjo, a one-stop cultural workshop that includes handicrafts from local 
craftsman, as an example of a successful creative industry preserving Sudanese cultural herit-
age). 
32. See, e.g., Heather Pringle, ISIS Cashing in on Looted Antiquities to Fuel Iraq In-
surgency, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (June 27, 2014), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/news/
2014/6/140626-isis-insurgents-syria-iraq-looting-antiquities-archaeology; ISIL and Antiquities 
Trafficking, F.B.I. (Aug. 26, 2015), https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/isil-and-antiquities-
trafficking. 
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1. Sustainable Economic Development
Cultural property can be the key for developing countries to break into 
one of the largest global economic sectors: tourism. Tourism is a major 
component of economies around the world, generating over $7.6 trillion
USD in 2016 (10.2% of the global GDP).
33
To get a share of that wealth, 





are adopting new strategies to increase their appeal to tourists. Tour-
ism has proved particularly critical to a number of emerging economies. For 
example, in 2016 tourism contributed $152.2 billion USD to the Brazilian 
economy (8.5% of the GDP),
36
$12.5 billion USD to the Croatian economy 
(24.7%),
37
and $19 billion USD to the Moroccan economy (18.5%).
38
In all 
three countries, the tourism industry provides hundreds of thousands of 
jobs.
39
Selling off cultural property would undermine the future of such tour-
ism in many developing countries. Cultural heritage is a significant draw for 
tourists,
40
and “cultural tours” have become an increasingly formalized sell-
ing point for travelers.
41
If cultural artifacts are on display at a museum or 
archaeological site inside the country, they can and do attract tourists and 
help to build a tourism economy.
42
Indeed, cultural and heritage tourists tend 
to stay in a host country longer and spend more money there than other 
33. WORLD TRAVEL & TOURISM COUNCIL, TRAVEL & TOURISM: ECONOMIC IMPACT 
& ISSUES 2017, 1 (2017). 
34. See, e.g., LONDON & PARTNERS, A Tourism Vision for London (2017), 
http://files.londonandpartners.com/l-and-p/assets/london_tourism_vision_aug_2017.pdf (de-
scribing recent developments in London’s tourism economy). 
35. See, e.g., Maylis Bellocq, Le Patrimoine Culturel Comme Resource Touristique: Le 
Bourg Ancient de Tongli, Province du Jiangsu, 46 L’ESPACE GÉOGRAPHIQUE 346 (2017) (de-
scribing the developments in the tourism economy of the Chinese town of Tongli since the 
1980s). 
36. WORLD TRAVEL & TOURISM COUNCIL, TRAVEL & TOURISM: ECONOMIC IMPACT 
2017 BRAZIL, 1 (2017), https://www.wttc.org/-/media/files/reports/economic-impact-
research/countries-2017/brazil2017.pdf [hereinafter TRAVEL & TOURISM: BRAZIL]. 
37. WORLD TRAVEL & TOURISM COUNCIL, TRAVEL & TOURISM: ECONOMIC IMPACT 
2017 CROATIA, 1 (2017), https://www.wttc.org/-/media/files/reports/economic-impact-
research/countries-2017/croatia2017.pdf [hereinafter TRAVEL & TOURISM: CROATIA]. 
38. WORLD TRAVEL & TOURISM COUNCIL, TRAVEL & TOURISM: ECONOMIC IMPACT 
2017 MOROCCO, 1 (2017), https://www.wttc.org/-/media/files/reports/economic-impact-
research/countries-2017/morocco2017.pdf [hereinafter TRAVEL & TOURISM: MOROCCO]. 
39. TRAVEL & TOURISM: BRAZIL, supra note 36, at 1; TRAVEL & TOURISM: CROATIA, 
supra note 37, at 1; TRAVEL & TOURISM: MOROCCO, supra note 38, at 1. 
40. DALLEN J. TIMOTHY, CULTURAL HERITAGE AND TOURISM: AN INTRODUCTION 1–
2 (2011); Ismaiel Naser Abuamoud et al., Factors Affecting the Willingness of Tourists to Vis-
it Cultural Heritage Sites in Jordan, 9 J. HERITAGE TOURISM 148, 149 (2014). 
41. See, e.g., Niall Finneran, Lucy to Lalibela: Heritage and Identity in Ethiopia in the 
Twenty-First Century, 19 INT’L J. HERITAGE STUDIES 41, 45 (2013).
42. NEIL BRODIE ET AL., STEALING HISTORY: THE ILLICIT TRADE IN CULTURAL 
MATERIAL 14 (2000).
588 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 41:581
types of tourists.
43
As it brings money into countries, the tourism industry 
also creates a significant number of jobs.
44
Tourism, and cultural property as 
a driver of tourism, can thus serve as a significant economic vehicle for de-
velopment.
Although many developing countries lack the internal resources to 
properly preserve and display their cultural property,
45
international funding 
and expertise tend to be available for these purposes across the globe.
46
While the total amount of funds available is still less than may be optimal,
47
there are a variety of financial resources developing countries can engage to 




and individual donors that have often not yet 
been fully tapped.
50
For example, Cambodia received between $10 and $20 
million USD in international investment and management consulting from 
the United Nations Development Programme (“UNDP”) and UNESCO.
51
These funds helped Cambodia preserve the historic ruins of Angkor and de-
velop a cultural tourism industry that now generates over one billion dollars 
43. See PACIFIC ASIA TRAVEL ASSOCIATION, THE ROLE OF CULTURE AND HERITAGE 
TOURISM IN BUILDING THE VISITOR ECONOMY—AND BEYOND 1 (Apr. 2015). 
44. See WORLD TRAVEL & TOURISM COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 2.
45. See MICHAEL M. AMES, CANNIBAL TOURS AND GLASS BOXES: THE 
ANTHROPOLOGY OF MUSEUMS xv (1992) (stating that some developing countries like India 
may not be able to afford as many museums as is desirable to accommodate their growing 
populations and extensive histories).
46. See e.g., THE WORLD BANK: URBAN DEV. SERIES, THE ECONOMICS OF 
UNIQUENESS: INVESTING IN HISTORIC CITY CORES AND CULTURAL HERITAGE ASSETS FOR 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT xxvii (Guido Licciardi & Rana Amirtahmasebi eds., 2012); 
David Throsby, Investment in Urban Heritage: Economic Impacts of Cultural Heritage Pro-
jects in Macedonia and Georgia, 16 WORLD BANK 15, 20–21 (2012), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTURBANDEVELOPMENT/Resources/336387-
1169585750379/UDS16_Investment+in+Urban+Heritage.pdf (discussing the variety of out-
side investments utilized in restoring sections of old Skopje, Macedonia). 
47. Guy Clausse, Funding Sources for Preserving Cultural Heritage Monuments and 
Sites, EUR. INV. BANK INST. (Nov. 25, 2013). 
48. See, e.g., International Funds Supporting Culture, UNESCO, https://en.unesco.org/
protecting-pour-heritage-and-fostering-creativity/international/funds/supporting/culture (last 
visited Apr. 24, 2020).
49. See, e.g., Grants Database: University of Pretoria Arts and Cultural Heritage Pro-
gram, MELLON FOUNDATION, https://mellon.org/grants/grants-database/grants/university-of-
pretoria/31700645 (last visited Apr. 24, 2020).
50. See, e.g., About Donors, INT’L CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE PRESERVATION AND 
RESTORATION OF CULT. PROP., https://www.iccrom.org/about/funding/donors (last visited 
Apr. 24, 2020). 
51. GLOBAL HERITAGE FUND, SAVING OUR VANISHING HERITAGE: SAFEGUARDING 
ENDANGERED CULTURAL HERITAGE SITES IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 37 (2010). 
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USD in revenue annually.
52
The World Bank also regularly provides finan-





The loss of cultural property can inflict a much deeper wound to a 
country than just to its economy. A country’s cultural property embodies the 
physical manifestation of its identity, history, and culture.
55
As such, it 
forms an essential element of the country’s national and historic identity. 
The loss of archaeological remains leads to the loss of a people’s heritage 
and history.
56
For example, the loss of the Elgin Marbles, friezes that origi-
nally adorned the Parthenon in Athens but which were transported to Britain 
and placed in the British museum in the early 1800s, continues to be widely 
mourned by Greeks as a loss of national identity.
57
It follows that cultural property can be a key component of education 
about one’s heritage.
58
Making this connection, Irina Bokova, the former Di-
rector-General of UNESCO, has opined that the illicit trade in cultural prop-
erty is “seriously detrimental, and often irreversibly so, to the collective 
memory, social cohesion, and mutual enrichment [of a nation].”
59
Cultural 
property can also be critical in unifying a nation and creating political and 
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., LB—Cultural Heritage Add. Financing, WORLD BANK, 
http://projects.worldbank.org/P116197/lb-cultural-heritage-add-financing?lang=en (last visit-
ed Apr. 24, 2020) (providing funding for the preservation of Lebanon’s built cultural herit-
age); Cultural Heritage Pilot Program, WORLD BANK, http://projects.worldbank.org/
P059763/cultural-heritage-pilot-project?lang=en (last visited Apr. 24, 2020) (providing fund-
ing for the reconstruction of Old Mostar Bridge and the historic district of Mostar in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina); Cultural Heritage Preservation Project, WORLD BANK,
http://projects.worldbank.org/P058969/cultural-heritage-preservation-project?lang=en (last 
visited Apr. 24, 2020) (providing funding for the conservation of four priority cultural herit-
age sites in Azerbaijan and for training restoration workers). 
54. See, e.g., Projects and Programs, GLOBAL HERITAGE FUND, 
https://globalheritagefund.org/what-we-do/projects-and-programs (last visited Apr. 24, 2020). 
55. Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of Cultural 
Property in the United States, 75 B.U. L. REV. 559, 562–65 (1995). 
56. BRODIE, DOOLE & WATSON, supra note 42, at 12–13. 
57. As Melina Mercouri, former Greek Minister of Culture, put it, “This is our history, 
this is our soul.” S.F. CHRON. (May 26, 1983), at 26 (speaking about the Elgin Marbles).
58. See, e.g., Nicole Gesche-Koning, Research for CULT Committee—Education in 
Cultural Heritage, POLICY DEPT. FOR STRUCTURAL & COHESION POLICIES, EUR.
PARLIAMENT 15–16 (2018), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/
617486/IPOL_STU(2018)617486_EN.pdf (describing the importance of heritage education in 
the context of Europe). 
59. Irina Bokova, Director-General of UNESCO, 40th Anniversary of the 1970 Con-
vention (Mar. 15, 2011) (transcript available in the UNESDOC Digital Library). 
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social bonds among its peoples through a shared understanding of their col-
lective past.
60
Accordingly, maintaining cultural property inside a country may help 
that country craft its own historical narrative.
61
Across the globe, cultural 
heritage preservation has been an essential tool in maintaining a nation’s in-
ternal image. For example, Balkan countries used surviving historical narra-
tives and remnants of cultural property from medieval times to craft a na-
tional narrative of independence based on the opposition of their former 
medieval kingdoms to the yoke of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth 
century.
62
To reinforce a sense of continuity with its longstanding Christian 
tradition, Ethiopia promoted the churches of Lalibela, perhaps the most 
iconic of Ethiopia’s medieval churches, through media and political rheto-
ric.
63
Meanwhile, Mexico has long used protective policies such as preserva-
tion of its cultural sites (e.g., Chichen Itza and Monte Albán) and the com-
mission of monuments to its indigenous cultural heritage (e.g., the 
Monument to Cuauhtémoc in Mexico City) to encourage connections with 
its pre-Hispanic past and its indigenous peoples, such as the Aztecs, Ma-
yans, and Zapotecs.
64





and the lack of a cohesive cultural narrative 
can be especially powerful in post-colonial contexts.
67
For example, the cul-
tures of the Maasai of Kenya and the Himbas of Namibia have often been 
portrayed in a distorted colonized context, which can be determinative of 
how Kenyans and Namibians, as well as the outside world, see these peo-
ples.
68
As education professors Ladislaus Semali and Tutalni Asino put it, 
60. See Gustavo de las Casas, Is Nationalism Good for You?, FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct. 8, 
2009), http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/08/is-nationalism-good-for-you. 
61. This is especially true when a country’s cultural property was inaccessible for a 
long period of its history and has only recently been rediscovered.
62. RYAN GINGERAS, FALL OF THE SULTANATE: THE GREAT WAR AND THE END OF 
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 75–76 (2016). 
63. Finneran, supra note 41, at 43–44, 53–54.
64. See Aztec and Maya Revival: Gallery Guide, MEXIC-ARTE MUSEUM (2008), 
http://www.mexic-artemuseum.org/images/uploads/education/Aztec_and_Maya_Revival_
Guide.pdf. 
65. See FARAH IBRAHIM & JIANNA HEUER, CULTURAL AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 
COUNSELING 15 (Anthony Marsella ed., 2016). 
66. See, e.g., E. O. Wahab et al., Causes and Consequences of Rapid Erosion of Cul-
tural Values in a Traditional African Society, 2012 J. ANTHROPOLOGY 6 (Feb. 2012) (study of 
the Awori people of Ado-Odo). 
67. See Finneran, supra note 41, at 43.
68. Ladislaus M. Semali & Tutaleni I. Asino, Decolonizing Cultural Heritage of Indig-
enous People’s Knowledge from Images in Global Films, 2 DECOLONIZATION: INDIGENEITY,
EDUC. & SOC’Y 25, 26–27, 32–33 (2013). 
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anthropologists’ interest in developing their portrayals of these peoples 
“was in the ‘other,’ not the ‘self.’”
69
The disappearance of a country’s cultural property, or the assignment of 
an otherized meaning to it,
70
only contributes to the fracturing or loss of a 
people’s narrative. Instead, cultural property can and should be harnessed to 
create local counter narratives, as it has been in the Balkans, Ethiopia, and 
Mexico.
71
On the other hand, before those narratives are embedded in the local 
psyche, a major reason for the looting of cultural property is the fact that lo-
cal residents often feel no real connection with the antiquities that surround 
them,
72
which contributes to a willingness to sell off cultural property as a 
living.
73
Yet cultural property is essential in “tell[ing] us who we are and 
where we came from.”
74
It is the memory of a society.
75
And the cultural 
identity it creates can also be essential in connecting disparate peoples, in 
turn helping to generate wealth, maintain political stability, and lower 
crime.
76
3. Countering Extremist Groups and Crime
The sale of cultural property usually lines criminals’ pockets,
77
and a 
state’s maintenance of its cultural property can therefore help to dry up a 
funding source for criminals and terrorists. Although the exact relationship 
between the illicit trade in cultural property and terrorism is still being de-
bated, the sale of cultural property provides clear opportunities for extremist 
69. Id. at 35. 
70. See John Henry Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural Property, 77 CAL. L.
REV. 339, 342–43 (1989). 
71. See Semali & Asino, supra note 68, at 28. 
72. See, e.g., ROGER ATWOOD, STEALING HISTORY: TOMB RAIDERS, SMUGGLERS,
AND THE LOOTING OF THE ANCIENT WORLD 57–58 (2004) (describing how the historical 
movements of people in Peru led to current locals having no connection to the historical in-
habitants of those areas); SHARON WAXMAN, LOOT: THE BATTLE OVER STOLEN TREASURES 
OF THE ANCIENT WORLD 142 (2008) (explaining that the modern residents of Turkey have no 
direct link with the ancient civilizations that once existed there); Tom Mueller, How 
Tomb Raiders Are Stealing Our History, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (June 2016), 
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/magazine/2016/06/looting-ancient-blood-antiquities 
(discussing how local Egyptian populations often feel no connection to the ancient artifacts 
they sell). 
73. See, e.g., Mueller, supra note 72.
74. Albert Elsen, Introduction: Why Do We Care About Art?, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 951, 
952 (1976).
75. Merryman, supra note 70.
76. See de las Casas, supra note 60. 
77. See generally Jessica Dietzler, On ‘Organized Crime’ in Illicit Antiquities Trade: 
Moving Beyond the Definitional Debate, 16 TRENDS IN ORGANIZED CRIME 329 (2013).
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groups to exploit.
78
For example, the Islamic State made millions of dollars 
from the illicit sale of antiquities to fuel its insurgency in Syria and Iraq.
79
It 
took full advantage of the global demand for cultural property—both on the 
black market and on online platforms such as eBay and Facebook—to fund 
not only its caliphate, but also devastating terrorist attacks across the 
globe.
80
The sale and destruction of cultural property has also been used as 
propaganda by terrorist groups such as the Ansar Dine in Mali and the Tali-
ban in Afghanistan.
81
Even where the cultural property trade has not been linked to an out-
right insurgency, it has frequently been linked to organized criminal net-
works such as gangs and local warlords.
82
Indeed, there is often a connec-
tion between the illicit cultural property trade and organized crime.
83
Although media has tended to misleadingly focus on the illicit antiquities 
trade within international criminal networks, the presence of organized do-
mestic crime, such as armed paramilitary groups in Cambodia in the last 
decades of the twentieth century,
84
is almost always a factor.
85
Even when 
some aspect of the cultural property trade is legal, its lucrative nature tends 
to drive a lack of accountability between the government and the people, an 
78. See RUSSELL D. HOWARD, MARC D. ELLIOTT & JONATHAN R. PROHOV, IS AND 
CULTURAL GENOCIDE: ANTIQUITIES TRAFFICKING IN THE TERRORIST STATE 14–16 (2016). 
79. Pringle, supra note 32; see also ISIL and Antiquities Trafficking, supra note 32. 
80. Fiona Rose-Greenland, How Much Money Has ISIS Made Selling Antiquities? 
More Than Enough to Fund Its Attacks, WASH. POST (June 3, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/06/03/how-much-money-has-isis-
made-selling-antiquities-more-than-enough-to-fund-its-attacks; see also Sangwon Yoon, Is-
lamic State Is Selling Looted Art Online for Needed Cash, BLOOMBERG (June 28, 2015), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-28/isis-has-new-cash-cow-art-loot-it-s-
peddling-on-ebay-facebook. 
81. Irina Bokova, Timbuktu Tomb Attack Is an Attack on Our Humanity, CNN (July 4, 
2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/02/opinion/unesco-mali-opinion; Luke Harding, Taliban 
Blow Apart 2,000 Years of Buddhist History, GUARDIAN (Mar. 3, 2001), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/mar/03/afghanistan.lukeharding; Lydia Polgreen, 
As Extremists Invaded, Timbuktu Hid Artifacts of a Golden Age, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2013), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/04/world/africa/saving-timbuktus-priceless-artifacts-from-
militants-clutches.html.
82. See, e.g., Mackenzie & Davis, supra note 24, at 729, 732 (discussing the northwest 
smuggling channel out of Cambodia, including the regional brokers and organized criminals 
who purchased from the brokers). 
83. Greg Borgstede, Cultural Property, the Palermo Convention, and Transnational 
Organized Crime, 20 INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP. 281, 285 (2014).
84. These groups actively looted cultural property complexes. Mackenzie & Davis, su-
pra note 24, at 730.
85. Blythe Bowman Proulx, Organized Criminal Involvement in the Illicit Antiquities 
Trade, 14 TRENDS IN ORGANIZED CRIME 1, 17, 24 (Oct. 2010). That is, organized domestic 
criminals can and do sell cultural property internationally, too.
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exacerbation of disparities in wealth, and even wars over access to cultural 
property.
86
Terrorism and related acts undermine democratic rule.
87
Organized 
crime kills just as many people as armed conflicts each year.
88
  The profita-
ble existence of terrorist, insurgent, and criminal groups is starkly opposed 
to a country’s interest in rule of law and stability. Therefore, it is in coun-
tries’ security interests to prevent the use of cultural property as a vehicle 
for funding extremist groups and local criminal organizations.
C. Reasons for a Country’s Inability or Unwillingness to 
Protect Its Cultural Property
There are clear benefits to preserving a country’s cultural property. Yet 
the major problem for many developing countries is not a lack of willpower, 
but a lack of the finances necessary to prevent cultural property from leav-
ing.
Other, more pressing crimes often draw scant resources away from the 
protection of cultural property,
89
and there is a general lack of funds to pro-
tect archaeological sites.
90
Developing countries frequently do not have the 
budget to enforce cultural property laws or protect existing treasures,
91
let 
alone to prevent the smuggling of newly unearthed artifacts.
92
For example, 
India spends less than 1% of its budget on culture, much less than countries 
such as France and the United Kingdom, resulting in poor maintenance of 
its existing museums.
93
86. See Stewart M. Patrick, Why Natural Resources Are a Curse on Developing Coun-
tries and How to Fix It, ATLANTIC (Apr. 30, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/
archive/2012/04/why-natural-resources-are-a-curse-on-developing-countries-and-how-to-fix-
it/256508 (noting these issues for countries rich in natural resources, whose trade raises issues 
similar issues to those in the trade of cultural property). 
87. Daniel L. Byman, How Terrorism Undermines Democracy, BROOKINGS
(Mar. 5, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/03/05/how-terrorism-
undermines-democracy.
88. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Global Study on Homicide: Executive 
Summary, at 12 (2019), https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/gsh/
Booklet1.pdf.
89. Borodkin, supra note 30, at 384. 
90. See MICHAEL M. AMES, CANNIBAL TOURS AND GLASS BOXES: THE 
ANTHROPOLOGY OF MUSEUMS xv (1992) (stating that some developing countries like India 
may not be able to afford as many museums as is desirable to accommodate their growing 
populations and extensive histories); see also Borodkin, supra note 30, at 384.
91. See James Ede, Ethics, the Antiquities Trade, and Archaeology, 7 INT’L J.
CULTURAL PROPERTY 128, 128 (1998) (“[L]ess money is available in artifact-rich nations, 
many of which are developing countries, for the conservation and security of national collec-
tions.”).
92. See Park, supra note 3, at 934 (speaking generally about developing countries). 
93. Maria Thomas, A Fading Taj and Shabby Museums, QUARTZ INDIA (Jan. 29, 
2017), https://qz.com/india/897228/a-fading-taj-and-shabby-museums-india-spends-less-than-
1-of-its-annual-budget-on-culture-and-it-shows. 
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The lack of funds to staff guards, in particular, has led to thefts of arti-
facts from museums and archaeological sites in developing countries. For 
example, in the wake of the Arab Spring, the number of guards provided by 
the Egyptian government to protect archaeological sites plummeted, as did 





A related issue is the lack of a skilled workforce and of the technologi-
cal capabilities to implement modern security measures. Modern collections 
should, as a best practice, be electronically documented to facilitate audits 
of their contents, which is difficult if there is not proper technical exper-
tise.
96
Other best practices adopted by the Cultural Properties Council of 
ASIS International and the American Alliance of Museums for museum se-
curity include electronic key card access and electronic intrusion detection 
systems,
97
which, in addition to their cost, also require expertise to install 
and maintain.
It is, naturally, even more difficult to have effective security measures 
in the case of yet undiscovered cultural property. Since this cultural property 
has not been discovered, it has no chance to be electronically documented as 
national cultural property, which makes it more difficult for countries to de-
termine whether a loss has occurred or to find the property in the future.
98
There is also an enforcement problem among importing countries, at least in 
the United States, since to prevent an import the government must prove 
that the cultural property was stolen, which is near impossible for a recent 
discovery with no documentation.
99
The Islamic State has used this dilemma 
to great effect, encouraging subsistence digging to uncover new artifacts 
that it can sell more easily with no available documentation on the black 
market.
100
Note, however, that even if the funding and expertise did exist to better 
guard museums and archaeological sites from casual theft, crime networks 
94. Salima Ikram, The Loss and Looting of Egyptian Antiquities, MIDDLE EAST INST.
(Apr. 28, 2014), https://www.mei.edu/publications/loss-and-looting-egyptian-antiquities.
95. Id.
96. See Davison Chiwara, Documentation: A Security Tool for the Identification and 
Repatriation of Illicitly Trafficked Objects from Museums with Particular Reference to the 
National Gallery of Zimbabwe, 2 HERITAGE 390, 398 (2019). 
97. CULTURAL PROPERTIES COUNCIL OF ASIS INTERNATIONAL, Suggested Practices 
for Museum Collections Space Security (2013), https://www.aam-us.org/wp-content/uploads/
2018/01/suggested-practices-for-museum-collections-space-security.pdf.
98. See Rachel Shabi, Looted in Syria—and Sold in London: The British Antiques 
Shops Dealing in Artefacts Smuggled by ISIS, GUARDIAN (July 3, 2015), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/03/antiquities-looted-by-isis-end-up-in-london-
shops.
99. See Patty Gerstenblith, Controlling the International Market in Antiquities: Reduc-
ing the Harm, Preserving the Past, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 169, 179 (2007).
100. Shabi, supra note 98.
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and semi-autonomous groups often have the power to resist enforcement.
101
Likewise, while a museum may be secure in a stable country, during periods 
of civil unrest, the ability for cultural property to leave the country increas-
es.
102
When security forces have their attention drawn to protests or upris-
ings or outright war, there is often lower cultural property protection, as in 
Syria due to its ongoing civil war.
103
Perhaps the best-known example of this 
phenomenon is the looting of the Iraq Museum in the wake of the U.S. inva-
sion of Iraq in 2003, which resulted in thousands of artifacts disappearing, 
including the famous Warka vase of ancient Sumer.
104
III. Alternatives for Protecting Cultural Property
Currently, there are two primary peacetime multilateral agreements on 
cultural property, detailed in more depth in Part IV: the UNESCO Conven-
tion and the UNIDROIT Convention.
105
Nevertheless, cultural property theft 
is still a large problem, and both Conventions have faced criticisms for their 
shortcomings.
106
Consequently, to rectify the international legal system’s 
apparently inadequate cultural property protections, scholars have suggested 
abolition of the Conventions, creation of a third convention to overcome 
these shortcomings, or other alternatives.
107
But while these proposals may 
have some merit, they ignore the benefits the existing Conventions would 
provide if they achieved greater ratification. As a result, this note suggests 
that the international community’s primary focus should be on securing 
broader ratification of those agreements.
A. Destruction of the Two Conventions or a New Convention
Two suggestions that have gained traction for better protecting cultural 
property are to abolish the UNESCO and UNIDROIT Conventions or to in-
stitute a third cultural property convention that supplements the current two.
101. See Borgstede, supra note 83, at 285; see also Mackenzie & Davis, supra note 24,
at 729, 732 (describing the workings of one criminal smuggling network in Cambodia).
102. See, e.g., Clemens D. Reichel, Lost Treasures from Iraq, in ORIENTAL INSTITUTE 
ANNUAL REPORT: 2004–05 74 (Gil J. Stein ed., 2005). 
103. See Christina Steenkamp, The Crime-Conflict Nexus and the Civil War in Syria, 6 
STABILITY: INT’L J. SECURITY & DEV. 1, 8 (2017). 
104. See generally CATASTROPHE! THE LOOTING AND DESTRUCTION OF IRAQ’S PAST
(Geoff Emberling & Katharyn Hanson eds., 2008). 
105. Veres, supra note 8, at 93. There is also the Hague Convention, which covers the 
protection of cultural property during international war. It has 133 States Parties but only re-
stricts the actions of state signatories (and only when they are at war with each other). Hague 
Convention, supra note 12, at 254. Non-state actors such as Al-Qaeda or the Islamic State 
cannot be signatories and are not covered by it. See id.
106. See, e.g., John Alan Cohan, An Examination of Archaeological Ethics and the Re-
patriation Movement Respecting Cultural Property (Part Two), 28 ENVIRONS 1, 8 (2004). 
107. See infra Part III.A and III.B.
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It is indeed true that the UNESCO and UNIDROIT Conventions are fal-
lible. But are they flawed enough to pass over entirely? Furthermore, would 
it even be possible to create a new treaty?
Jeanette Greenfield’s criticisms of the UNESCO Convention in 1996 
still largely hold true: The Convention only covers recorded cultural proper-
ty, the scope of its protection is unclear, restitution under the Convention 
can take years, and there are no formal means to resolve disputes between 
States Parties.
108
Eric Posner has argued that the UNESCO Convention has 
failed to erode the black market in illicit antiquities, and the entire regime 
should be abolished.
109
Yet there have been successful returns of cultural 
property under the UNESCO Convention.
110
Indeed, the UNESCO Conven-
tion was the primary vehicle used to recover hundreds of stolen artifacts in 
the last two years.
111
Hence, even though enforcement is not perfect, the 
UNESCO Convention has had, as will be detailed below, some positive ef-
fects.
112
Even some effect is better than none.
Other articles have advocated instead for the creation of a third agree-
ment that would solve the shortcomings of the UNESCO and UNIDROIT 
Conventions. Zsuzsanna Veres advocates for an agreement that better com-
promises between the needs of source and market countries,
113
and Edward 
Cottrell argues for an agreement that creates a specialized dispute resolution 
body.
114
But creating a new cultural property convention would require ex-
actly the kind of compromise that these critics believe renders the existing 
treaties insufficient: To gain market country signatories, a new convention 
will have to pander to their interests, just as, in a compromise with market 
country signatories over the creation of a restitution mechanism lacking in 
the UNESCO Convention, the UNIDROIT Convention places more of the 
burdens and costs of litigation on source countries, as discussed below.
It is also important to note that many of the weaknesses of the 
UNESCO Convention were meant to be countered by the UNIDROIT Con-
vention. Posner disregards the important fact that the UNIDROIT Conven-
tion operates in conjunction with the UNESCO Convention. Veres and Ed-
ward Cottrell do address the UNIDROIT Convention but move on to their 
108. JEANETTE GREENFIELD, THE RETURN OF CULTURAL TREASURES 258–60 (2d ed. 
1996). 
109. See Eric A. Posner, The International Protection of Cultural Property: Some Skep-
tical Observations, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 213, 214–15, 218, 228–30 (2007). 
110. See Recent Restitution Cases of Cultural Objects Using the 1970 Convention,
UNESCO, http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/illicit-trafficking-of-cultural-
property/recent-restitution-cases-of-cultural-objects-using-the-1970-convention (last visited 
Apr. 24, 2020). 
111. See e.g., id. (indicating that in seven instances, parties acquired restitution for a to-
tal of hundreds of cultural objects in 2018 and 2019).
112. See infra Part IV.B.
113. Veres, supra note 8, at 111–13.
114. Cottrell, supra note 8, at 653–55.
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proposed additions rather than analyzing the particular benefits the Conven-
tion already has for developing countries.
115
Unlike these earlier scholars,
this note suggests that an adequate protection of cultural property depends 
upon states adhering to both Conventions, as the UNIDROIT Convention 
was meant to rectify many of the shortcomings of the UNESCO Conven-
tion.
This is not to say that the combination of the two Conventions is a per-
fect solution. The UNIDROIT Convention does place more burdens and 
costs on source countries to litigate their claims, as discussed below,
116
and 
it is severely undermined by the low number of signatories.
117
However, to 
get market countries to agree to the UNIDROIT Convention, it was neces-
sary to split the costs to some degree. A compromise was necessary to cre-
ate a proper restitution mechanism, which the UNESCO Convention lacked.
Creating a new cultural property convention would require a similar 
compromise. In contrast, it is a remarkably good deal for source countries 
that practically every major market country has already signed onto the 
UNESCO Convention and that a number of them, including China, France, 
and Spain, have signed onto the UNIDROIT Convention as well.
118
It is pos-
sible to draft a new cultural property treaty that creates an international arbi-
tration process for the restitution of cultural property, one that places greater 
obligations on market countries, and that establishes penalties for not com-
plying with the articles of the convention,
119
but the odds of such a conven-
tion being accepted by the community of nations are low without significant 
compromises from source countries.
120
In any case, important as these suggestions may be, they skip the ques-
tion of whether the UNESCO and UNIDROIT Conventions, as they current-
ly stand, offer enough benefits for developing countries to become States 
Parties.
121
Indeed, there is no reason why a third convention, if it could be 
adopted, could not work in coordination with the already existing UNESCO 
and UNIDROIT Conventions, which are readily available for ratification
now. The prospect of an even better convention does not remove the availa-
115. See Veres, supra note 8, at 100–02; Cottrell, supra note 8, at 631–39.
116. See infra Part IV.F. 
117. UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects (Rome, 
1995)—Status, UNIDROIT, https://www.unidroit.org/status-cp (last updated Dec. 2, 2019) 
(fifty-eight states have signed the Convention and only forty-eight have implemented it).
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., Cottrell, supra note 8, at 648; Veres, supra note 8, at 111–13 (both sug-
gesting new international treaties to protect cultural property).
120. See Cottrell, supra note 8, at 657.
121. Though Veres and Cottrell do address the UNIDROIT Convention, they do not do 
so in any analytical depth; they move directly on to their proposed additions rather than ana-
lyze the particular benefits for developing countries. See Veres, supra note 8, at 100–02; Cot-
trell, supra note 8, at 631–39.
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bility of using currently available ones, especially since they provide signif-
icant benefits to developing countries.
B. Other Alternatives
Instead of crafting a new convention, one scholar has suggested using 
another existing international treaty, the United Nations Convention Against 
Transnational Organized Crime (“UNTOC”), to fill gaps in the UNESCO 
and UNIDROIT Conventions.
122
Some others have even proposed that 
source countries sell off their cultural property through a state auction sys-
tem.
123
Greg Borgstede describes how UNTOC could be used to protect cultur-
al property.
124
Notably, though UNTOC can help enforce the protection of 
cultural property, it does not explicitly address cultural property in the same 
detail as the UNESCO and UNIDROIT Conventions. Its lack of specificity 
allows for varying interpretations by different states. Borgstede explains that 
one of the best reasons to use UNTOC as a tool for cultural property protec-
tion is this convention’s broad membership network.
125
Yet one may achieve 
the same advantage by increasing ratification of the UNESCO and 
UNIDROIT Conventions. Of course, fully employing the UNESCO and 
UNIDROIT Conventions does not mean that UNTOC cannot be used too.
126
Instead, they could be used as complementary methods; but moving straight 
to UNTOC while ignoring UNESCO and UNIDROIT leaves substantial 
benefits for developing countries on the table.
Alternatively, Lisa Borodkin has suggested that countries publicly auc-
tion off their cultural property and create a regulated market instead of an 
illicit one.
127
This solution would offer the benefit of directly undercutting 
the illicit market and its associated ills by creating a new, legally regulated 
market,
128
and it has been suggested for other illegal activities that have 
connections to associated crime, such as the sale and consumption of mari-
juana.
129
This solution is problematic, however, in that it only addresses the 
state’s desire to cut off the criminal funding provided by theft of cultural 
122. Cf. Borgstede, supra note 83, at 284.
123. Borodkin, supra note 30, at 411–16.
124. Borgstede, supra note 83, at 285.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 286. (acknowledging that the focus on the United Nations Convention 
Against Transnational Organized Crime may detract from the UNESCO and UNIDROIT 
Conventions).
127. See e.g., Borodkin, supra note 30, at 411–16.
128. Id. at 412.
129. See, e.g., Tamar Todd, The Benefits of Marijuana Legalization and Regulation, 23 
BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 99, 111–14 (2018).
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property, disregarding the benefits a state receives from maintaining its cul-
tural property, as discussed above.
130
IV. International Law Protections: UNESCO Convention and 
UNIDROIT Convention
In sum, the existing scholarship provides creative solutions, but it has 
overlooked the benefits provided by the existing UNESCO and UNIDROIT 
Conventions. Increasing the number of parties to the UNESCO and 
UNIDROIT Conventions could bring untapped international support to 
countries trying to maintain their cultural property. This part will discuss the 
legal requirements and remedies, benefits for developing countries, and 
shortcomings of the UNESCO and the UNIDROIT Conventions. While the 
UNESCO and UNIDROIT Conventions are undersubscribed by source 
countries and there are valid shortcomings in both treaties, this part con-
cludes that they provide substantial benefits to developing countries and 
therefore suggests that international protection of cultural property would be 
enhanced if developing countries sign onto the UNESCO and UNIDROIT 
Conventions as they currently stand.
A. UNESCO Convention Overview
UNESCO established the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and 
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural 
Property in 1970.
131
The States Parties to the UNESCO Convention recog-
nize that the illicit transfer of cultural property from countries impoverishes 
their cultural heritage and that international cooperation is the best defense 
against such losses.
132
By agreeing to the UNESCO Convention, States Parties undertake to 
oppose the illicit trade of cultural property.
133
This obligation cuts both 
ways: States Parties must take steps both to prevent the exportation of their 
own cultural property and to prevent the importation of cultural property 
from other countries.
134
The obligation to prevent unlawful exportation re-
quires a State Party to set up a national service dedicated to the protection of 
cultural heritage.
135
This national service drafts laws and regulations to pro-
tect cultural property, maintains a list of known national cultural property, 
130. See supra Part II.B.
131. UNESCO Convention, supra note 9. 
132. Id. art. 2(1).
133. Id. art. 2(2). A State Party to a treaty “is a country that has ratified or acceded to 
that particular treaty, and is therefore legally bound by the provisions in the instrument.” In-
troduction to the Convention of the Rights of the Child: Definition of Key Terms Used in the 
UN Treaty Collection, UNICEF, https://www.unicef.org/french/crc/files/Definitions.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 24, 2020).
134. See UNESCO Convention, supra note 9, art. 3.
135. Id. art. 5
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and promotes the institutional preservation and presentation of cultural 
property.
136
It also is responsible for organizing excavations, establishing 
ethical rules for dealers and curators in accordance with the Convention, 
taking steps to develop respect for all cultural heritages, and publicizing the 
disappearance of any cultural property.
137
To prevent unlawful exportation a 
State Party is obliged to certify lawful exportations of cultural property.
138
States Parties also have a duty to prevent the importation of illegal cul-
tural property from other States Parties,
139
particularly cultural property sto-
len from another State Party’s museums, religious or secular monuments, 
and similar sites.
140
Notably, this duty only applies to imports from other 
States Parties, not from all countries.
141
As part of this requirement, a State
Party must ban its museums and similar institutions from acquiring new cul-
tural property illicitly taken from another State Party and must inform the 
country of origin if such property is recovered.
142
A State Party may also re-
quest that another State Party take steps to recover and return improperly-
acquired cultural property imported after the Convention was implemented 
in both States.
143
A State Party may even send a general request to other 
States Parties to protect its cultural property if that property is in jeopardy of 
being pillaged, and responding countries must act in concert with the re-
questing nation to “determine and carry out concrete measures,” including 
taking provisional measures to prevent irreparable damage to the cultural 
property in question.
144
Moreover, a State Party must comply with another 
State Party’s classification of its cultural property as inalienable for import 
purposes.
145
This means that a State Party can declare what constitutes cul-
tural property under the ambit of the Convention’s protections and declare 
that any, or even all, of its cultural property cannot be legally removed from 





138. Id. art. 6.
139. Id. art. 7. 
140. Id. art. 7(b)(i).
141. See id. 
142. Id. art. 7(a).
143. Id. art. 7(b)(ii).
144. Id. art. 9. 
145. Id. art. 13(d). States Parties may list their protected cultural property under article 
5(b). 
146. Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the Convention on the Means of 
Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural 
Property, UNESCO, ¶¶ 33–38, http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/
HQ/CLT/pdf/OPERATIONAL_GUIDELINES_EN_FINAL_FINAL.pdf (last visited Apr. 24, 
2020). For example, Greece’s antiquities law protects all ancient moveable and immoveable 
monuments and other cultural objects that date to prehistoric, ancient, Byzantine, and Post-
Byzantine times, if they are listed in the National Archive of Monuments. Nomos (3028:2002) 
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The UNESCO Convention also has several procedures to protect the 
cultural property of countries and territories that are under a temporary or 
permanent occupation. The Convention explicitly provides that a State Party 
is obligated not only to protect its own cultural property but also to protect 
the property of any territories that are under that country’s political leader-
ship.
147
At the time of accession to the Convention, States Parties must con-
sult with the local authorities in territories they occupy with the specific 
goal of having the Convention apply in these territories.
148
Additionally, the 
Convention prohibits the transfer of ownership of cultural property “under 
compulsion arising directly or indirectly from the occupation of a country 
by a foreign power.”
149
Under the Convention, UNESCO also has a consulting and dispute res-
olution role. Any State Party may call on UNESCO to help offer infor-
mation, education, expert advice, and coordination on cultural property 
identification and protection.
150
If two States Parties in a cultural property 
dispute agree, UNESCO may also serve as an arbitrator in the dispute.
151
In sum, the UNESCO Convention primarily restricts the importation of 
one State Party’s cultural property by another,
152
and this framework has 
been effective. The Convention’s import restrictions have led to the restitu-
tion of hundreds of pieces of stolen cultural property that have been de-
tained upon importation.
153
It has also led museums and collectors to change 
their policies to be more cautious toward acquiring cultural property.
154
B. Benefits of the UNESCO Convention for Developing Countries
For source countries, which are often developing countries, the 
UNESCO Convention provides significant advantages. First, the UNESCO 
Convention improves international responses to cultural property theft by 
fighting against illicit trade through forced transparency and codified legal 
obligations for States Parties. Additionally, the Convention is particularly 
devised to benefit source countries, and it sets enforcement obligations in 
accordance with each country’s economic means. Finally, the Convention’s 
strength grows with its number of States Parties. Although more universal 
Gia tin prostasía ton Archaiotíton kai en génei tis Polistikís Klironomiás [On the Protection of 
Antiquities And Cultural Heritage in General], EPHEMERIS TES KYVERNESEOS TES 
HELLENIKES DEMOKRATIAS [E.K.E.D.] 2002, A:153 (Greece).
147. UNESCO Convention, supra note 9, arts. 12, 22.
148. Id.
149. Id. art. 11.
150. Id. art. 17(1).
151. Id. art. 17(5). See generally Restitution of Cultural Property: Mediation and Con-
ciliation, UNESCO, http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/restitution-of-cultural-
property/mediation-and-conciliation (last visited Apr. 24, 2020).
152. Id. arts. 1, 3, 5(a), 7, 13(a); Veres, supra note 8, at 99.
153. See infra notes 168–169 and accompanying text. 
154. See Cohan, supra note 106, at 48.
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accession would not completely eliminate licit or illicit trade in cultural 
property,
155
increased Convention membership would help limit the scope 
and extent of the trade and impose legal investigatory obligations on States 
Parties.
First, the UNESCO Convention improves transparency for the trade in 
cultural properties among its signatories. To understand why, look to the 
mechanics of the broader art market, which contribute to the illicit trade in 
cultural properties. The art auction system, for example, operates on ano-
nymity and opaqueness; at an auction, it is incredibly hard to know what is 
for sale and who owns what.
156
Moreover, the antiquities black market is a 
complex system of middlemen and obfuscation.
157
This opacity, coupled 
with the frequency of sales transactions, can make identifying that any par-
ticular object has been illegally moved from its source country impossible 
for the final purchaser.
158
The UNESCO Convention seeks to ameliorate this 
problem by requiring antique dealers to maintain a register of the price, 
provenance (or path of origin), and  description of traded cultural proper-
ty.
159
Second, the Convention, by obliging States Parties to prevent the illicit 
import of cultural property into their territories and the illicit trade of cultur-
al property inside their territories,
160
prompts active monitoring of the trade 
in cultural property.
161
For example, the United States passed the Cultural 
Property Implementation Act (“CPIA”) to implement and enforce its 
UNESCO Convention obligations.
162
Under the CPIA, U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection (“CBP”) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(“ICE”) are responsible for stopping illicit cultural property trade at the bor-
155. Alexander A. Bauer, New Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property: A Critical 
Appraisal of the Antiquities Trade Debates, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 690, 696 (2007). 
156. See Borodkin, supra note 30, at 386; Carl Schneider, Lecture at University of 
Michigan Law School: An Art Collector Looks at Art Law (Mar. 7, 2018). 
157. See Faucon, Kantchev & MacDonald, supra note 2.
158. Id.
159. UNESCO Convention, supra note 9, art. 10(a).
160. Id. art. 12. 
161. See, e.g., Questions and Answers on the Illegal Import of Cultural Goods Used to 
Finance Terrorism, EUROPEAN COMM’N (July 13, 2017), https://ec.europa.eu/
commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_17_1954 (describing recent attempts to reinforce 
monitoring of free ports and free zones); Boosting National Responses to the Illicit Trade in 
Cultural Property, INTERPOL (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-
Events/News/2018/Boosting-national-responses-to-the-illicit-trade-in-cultural-property (ex-
plaining new monitoring initiatives by countries in Southern Africa); U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-716, IRAQI AND SYRIAN CULTURAL PROPERTY: U.S.
GOVERNMENT COMMITTEE SHOULD INCORPORATE ADDITIONAL COLLABORATION 
PRACTICES 14 (2017) (describing increased U.S. monitoring of imports to find stolen Iraqi 
and Syrian cultural property). 
162. Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2613
(current through P.L. 115–72). 
2020] Keeping the Barbarians at the Gates 603
der.
163
CBP is effectively the front line, with the ability to search, detain, and 
seize suspect property.
164
ICE handles investigations, including looking into 
whether individuals or institutions are illegally importing cultural property 
into the United States.
165
This system has been effective at catching cultural 
property theft. A high profile example is the 2017 case against Hobby Lob-
by for attempting to import stolen Iraqi cultural property.
166
The violation
was uncovered by CBP, investigated by ICE, and then litigated by the Jus-
tice Department.
167
The United States is not alone in successfully finding illicitly-traded 
cultural property and returning it to its country of origin. UNESCO main-
tains a lengthy tab of Convention success stories.
168
Recent returns include 
the Netherlands repatriating a mosaic to Cyprus; Kuwait returning a coffin 
lid to Egypt; and Germany, Italy, and Switzerland collectively repatriating 
pre-Colombian archaeological objects to Guatemala.
169
While non-
Convention member countries are of course also capable of repatriating sto-
len property when they find it, the Convention provides source countries 
with actual commitments rather than the mere goodwill of a market country.
Another benefit for developing countries is that accession to the 
UNESCO Convention does not impose substantial new costs on them. Arti-
cle 2 of the UNESCO Convention simply mandates that States Parties “un-
dertake to oppose such practices with the means at their disposal.”
170
While
the ambiguity of the term “means” might allow some States Parties to shirk 
their duties, UNESCO’s long list of Convention-brokered success stories 
suggests that many states are treating their commitments solemnly. At the 
same time, the phrasing of article 2 reflects the reality of the developed-
developing country dichotomy: Developing countries often do not have the 
163. Id.
164. U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, WHAT EVERY MEMBER OF THE TRADE 
COMMUNITY SHOULD KNOW ABOUT: WORKS OF ART, COLLECTOR’S PIECES, ANTIQUITIES,
AND OTHER CULTURAL PROPERTY (May 2006), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=714809. 
165. Cultural Property, Art and Antiquities Investigations, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND 
CUSTOMS ENF’T, https://www.ice.gov/cultural-art-investigations (last visited Apr. 24, 2020).
166. Complaint, United States v. Four Hundred Fifty Ancient Cuneiform Tablets, CV 
17-3980 (E.D.N.Y. July 5, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/press-
release/file/978096/download.
167. Id.; see also Michael Goodyear, Hobby Lobby Goes From Arts and Crafts to 
Illegal Antiquities, CULTURAL HERITAGE CRISIS (July 8, 2017), 
https://culturalpropertylawblog.wordpress.com/2017/07/08/hobby-lobby-goes-from-arts-and-
crafts-to-illegal-antiquities. 
168. Other Cases of Return or Restitution of Cultural Objects, UNESCO,
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/illicit-trafficking-of-cultural-property/other-
cases-of-return-or-restitution-of-cultural-objects (last visited Apr. 24, 2020). 
169. Id.
170. UNESCO Convention, supra note 9, art. 2. 
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resources to actively patrol their borders,
171
which is one of the reasons for 
the existence of the illicit cultural property trade in the first place. The 
UNESCO Convention, by calibrating required expenses to each party’s eco-
nomic “means,” purposefully encourages developing countries to take ad-
vantage of its protections by placing a higher burden on wealthier countries.
In addition, it is a sound policy choice to invest in some level of cultural 
property protection, for the reasons detailed above in Part II.B, so the 
UNESCO Convention requirement just codifies what is in practice benefi-
cial for developing countries.
172
And while there are certainly costs associat-
ed with maintaining a cultural property database,
173
monitoring trade and il-
licit activities,
174
and establishing ethical rules and educational initiatives,
175
these requirements are relatively inexpensive compared to the amount de-
veloped countries spend on protecting cultural property.
176
Finally, the goal of the UNESCO Convention is that collective action 
by all the signatories will help solve the problem.
177
There are 140 States 
Parties to the UNESCO Convention as of December 2019.
178
This leaves 
over fifty countries recognized by the United Nations that are not parties to 
the Convention. Surprisingly, while there are a few wealthy countries such 
as Ireland and Israel that have not accepted the Convention, the vast majori-
ty of non-signatories are from the developing world, particularly in the Car-
ibbean, the Pacific, and Africa.
179
As these countries are more likely to be 
171. Susan E. Rice, Speech at University of Michigan Law School: The National Securi-
ty Implications of Global Poverty (Jan. 30, 2006).
172. See generally STOP HERITAGE CRIMES. GOOD PRACTICES AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS (2011).
173. UNESCO Convention, supra note 9, art. 5. 
174. Id. art. 10.
175. Id. art. 5.
176. For example, Hungary spent the most out of any country in the European Union on 
the much larger category of “recreation, culture, and religion” in 2016, and this was 3.3% of 
its annual GDP. The costs of a database and a set of rules would likely be substantially less. 
Government Expenditure on Recreation, Culture and Religion, EUROSTAT (Mar. 12, 2018), 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Government_expenditure_on_
recreation,_culture_and_religion. 
177. Marilyn E. Phelan, The UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported 
Cultural Objects Confirms a Separate Property Status for Cultural Treasures, 5 JEFFREY S.
MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 31, 36 (1998).
178. 1970 Convention States Parties, UNESCO, http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/
themes/illicit-trafficking-of-cultural-property/1970-convention/states-parties (last visited Apr. 
24, 2020).
179. The UN Member States that have not accepted the UNESCO Convention are An-
dorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Brunei, Burundi, Capo Verde, Comoros, Congo, Domini-
ca, Eritrea, Fiji, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Kenya, 
Kiribati, Liberia, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Moldova, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, 
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, 
Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Suriname, Thai-
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the source of illicitly traded properties than their market, they actually have 
the most to gain from signing onto the UNESCO Convention.
C. Shortcomings of the UNESCO Convention for Developing Countries
Because the Convention imposes more stringent obligations on market 
countries, it is understandable that some would reject the Convention,
180
but 
it is less clear why source countries would reject it. However, while the 
UNESCO Convention does provide benefits for cultural property protection, 
particularly for developing countries, it is not without its problems. The 
Convention does not have any enforcement or recovery mechanisms outside 
of those its member states choose to implement, it allows state reservations, 
and it is not retroactive. These shortcomings could help explain the reluc-
tance of some countries to sign onto the UNESCO Convention, as could 
economic reasons and a lack of awareness of the full range of the Conven-
tion’s benefits.
Perhaps the greatest weakness of the UNESCO Convention is that it 
does not create any domestic or international procedures for enforcing its 
obligations.
181
It does not stipulate a domestic court remedy for cultural 
property theft, nor does it create an international enforcement and dispute 
resolution system akin to that of other international treaties such as the 
WTO.
182
However, it is worth considering why a country would sign on to 
the UNESCO Convention if it had no desire to intervene in the illicit cultur-
al property trade. Likely, it would not. Indeed, the fact that most major mar-
ket countries have ratified the UNESCO Convention and have enforced 
their Convention obligations
183
shows that it has some vitality even without 
mandatory enforcement mechanisms.
184
An additional weakness is that States Parties can register reservations to 
the Convention at the time of their acceptance, which can create a patch-
land, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, and Vanua-
tu. Compare Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export 
and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property—States, UNESCO, 
http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=13039&language=E (last visited Apr. 24, 
2020) with Member States, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/member-states (last vis-
ited May 13, 2020). 
180. Veres, supra note 8, at 108.
181. Nina R. Lenzner, Note, The Illicit International Trade in Cultural Property: Does 
the UNIDROIT Convention Provide an Effective Remedy for the Shortcomings of the 
UNESCO Convention?, 15 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 469, 477–78 (1994).
182. See id. at 479; see also Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Set-
tlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Or-
ganization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401.
183. See, e.g., Patty Gerstenblith, Implementation of the 1970 UNESCO Convention by 
the United States and Other Market Nations 17 (2017), https://www.law.upenn.edu/
live/files/6423-gerstenblith-patty-2017-implementation-of-the-1970 (last visited Apr. 24, 
2020). 
184. See Gerstenblith, supra note 99, at 175.
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work of varying obligations from state to state.
185
For example, Australia 
took a reservation to article 10 of the Convention, which requires states to 
oblige antique dealers to maintain registers of their items.
186
But while the 
ability to register reservations could weaken the protections of the Conven-
tion, all reservations to date place limitations only at the outer bounds of the 
treaty, like Australia’s reservation, instead of declining to follow its core 
commitments.
187
Furthermore, treaty reservations are permitted by the Vien-
na Convention on the Law of Treaties precisely to allow the international 
community to maximize the number of signatories to a multilateral treaty 
without gutting the core of that treaty.
188
Another reason why source countries have been reluctant to sign onto 
the UNESCO Convention is because it does not apply retroactively.
189
While non-retroactivity is standard with international treaties, it is problem-
atic in the context of cultural property because it does not provide any re-
covery for the large amount of cultural property taken from countries in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries under the aegis of colonialism and impe-
rialism.
190
Still, this does not nullify the benefits of at least having restitution 
going forward.
Economics may also factor in. Even though the Convention limits im-
plementation to what is within a country’s economic “means,”
191
costs could 
still be a deterrent. Furthermore, the UNESCO Convention does require 
States Parties to pay “just compensation” to innocent purchasers, which cre-
ates a financial burden on States Parties who are only recovering what was 
illicitly removed from their territories.
192
While the Convention does provide 
assistance from other States Parties to monitor imports and catch illicit 
185. States Parties may, at the time of signing, declare reservations to any treaty that 
does not prohibit reservations. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 19, May 23, 
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; 8 I.L.M. 679 (1696) [hereinafter VCLT]; see also Convention on 
the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership 
of Cultural Property, Jan. 10, 1990, 823 U.N.T.S. 23; Convention on the Means of Prohibiting 
and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property 
1970, UNESCO, http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13039&URL_DO=DO_
TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html#RESERVES (last visited Apr. 24, 2020) (listing all res-
ervations and declarations made by States Parties to the UNESCO Convention). 
186. Australian Reservations to Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing 
the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Jan. 10, 1990, 823 
U.N.T.S. 231.
187. Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export 
and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, supra note 185.
188. Marko Milanovic & Linos-Alexander Sicilianos, Reservations to Treaties: An In-
troduction, 24 EURO. J. INT’L L. 1055, 1056 (2013); see also VCLT, supra note 185, at 336–
38.
189. Gerstenblith, supra note 183, at 26.
190. Id.
191. UNESCO Convention, supra note 9, art. 2.
192. Cohan, supra note 106, at 44.
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movements of cultural property, there is undoubtedly still a cost for devel-
oping countries.
193
It is also possible that it is not a fault in the Convention, but rather its 
entire purpose, with which a country takes issue. A country’s government 
may favor selling cultural property, even knowing that it is not in the long-
term interests of the country. For example, in the midst of the ongoing civil 
war in Syria, the Assad government is suspected of taking bribes to facili-
tate the exportation of cultural property, if not actively supporting such ex-
portation.
194
India has also suggested eliminating government-issued licens-
es for antiquities dealers, although it should be noted that this is highly 
controversial.
195
Finally, a lack of awareness of the extent of the benefits provided by the 
UNESCO Convention or apathy towards cultural property protection could 
also explain some countries’ reluctance to sign onto the Convention, espe-
cially if other, more pressing socioeconomic concerns are considered. In de-
veloping countries, cultural property protection may not be competitive with 
more pressing issues such as food security, ecological problems due to cli-
mate change, financial weakness,
196
or the need for sustainable develop-
ment.
197
Even developed countries often do not prioritize cultural property 
protection, as shown by the United States-led coalition’s treatment of cul-
tural property in Iraq during the 2003 invasion and its aftermath.
198
Coun-
tries could also simply not be aware of how the benefits of the UNESCO 
Convention militate in favor of accession.
D. UNIDROIT Convention Overview
While the UNESCO Convention laid the groundwork for the protection 
of designated cultural property by instituting rules that would mitigate its 
flow to market countries, the UNIDROIT Convention, adopted in 1995, 
supplements the UNESCO Convention by contemplating rules for the return 
193. See id.
194. Neil Brodie & Isber Sabrine, The Illegal Excavation and Trade of Syrian Cultural 
Objects: A View from the Ground, 43 J. FIELD ARCHAEOLOGY 74, 79 (2017). 
195. Kate Fitz Gibbon, New Art Law for India?, CULT. PROP. NEWS (Oct. 27, 2017), 
https://culturalpropertynews.org/new-art-law-for-india. 
196. See Rosamond Hutt, What Are the 10 Biggest Global Challenges?, WORLD ECON.
F. (Jan. 21, 2016), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/what-are-the-10-biggest-global-
challenges. 
197. See, e.g., Priorities of Developing Nations Must Be Centre of Attention, Says India,
ECON. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2016), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-
nation/priorities-of-developing-nations-must-be-centre-of-attention-says-india/articleshow/
50556262.cms.
198. See The Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict: Unneces-
sary Distraction or Mission-Relevant Priority?, 2 NATO OPEN PUBLICATIONS 1, 5 (2018). 
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of any cultural property that unlawfully leaves a source country.
199
The obli-
gation to return cultural property is particularly important to developing 
countries.
200
The UNIDROIT Convention requires owners to return any cul-
tural property, however obtained, to its country of origin if the law of that 
country considers the ownership invalid and that country is a State Party to 
the Convention.
201
Moreover, the source country is not required to have pre-
viously specified the object as cultural property, as it must under the 
UNESCO Convention. 
202
This expansion is crucial, as cultural property is 
often privately owned or previously unexcavated,
203
which makes it particu-
larly difficult to repatriate under the UNESCO Convention alone.
The UNIDROIT Convention homes in on cultural property that a mar-
ket country has failed to stop at the border and return as required under the 
country’s UNESCO Convention obligations. In these situations, the 
UNIDROIT Convention permits a State Party to request that the importing 
state’s domestic courts—or, if the states agree, another court or arbitral pan-
el
204
—order the return of any cultural property that was illegally exported.
205
To succeed, the state claimant must prove a violation of its laws “regulating 
the export of cultural objects for the purpose of protecting its cultural herit-
age.”
206
The UNIDROIT Convention thus expands the scope of cultural proper-
ty that is protected and provides for judicial recovery of stolen property not 
present in the UNESCO Convention.
207
This recovery mechanism gives the 
199. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 10. The UNIDROIT Convention uses the term 
“cultural objects” instead of “cultural property,” but its definition is similar to the definition of 
the term cultural property that is used in the UNESCO Convention. Id. art. 1 & annex. Cultur-
al objects are defined in the UNIDROIT Convention as “those which, on religious or secular 
grounds, are of importance for archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or science and 
belong to one of the categories listed in the Annex to this Convention.” Id. art. 2. The Annex 
incorporates the language used by the UNESCO Convention to define cultural property. Id. 
annex.
200. Id.
201. Id. art. 3; see also art. 1 (stating that the Convention applies to claims regarding the 
“return of cultural objects removed from the territory of a Contracting State”). 
202. The UNESCO Convention explicitly requires that the cultural property “is specifi-
cally designated by each State.” UNESCO Convention, supra note 9, art. 1. The UNIDROIT 
Convention does not list any such requirement.
203. See e.g., Ralph Blumenthal & Tom Mashberg, The Curse of the Outcast Artifact,
N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/15/arts/design/antiquity-
market-grapples-with-stricter-guidelines-for-gifts.html (noting that 100,000 privately owned 
ancient Greek and Roman artifacts lacked adequate provenance, suggesting that the works 
were unrecorded or possibly from unexcavated sites).
204. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 10, art. 8.
205. Id. art. 3.
206. Id. art. 1.
207. See UNIDROIT Secretariat, UNIDROIT Activities, 6 UNIFORM L. REV. 476, 564 
(2001). 
2020] Keeping the Barbarians at the Gates 609
UNIDROIT Convention teeth the UNESCO Convention lacks, rather than 
just relying on States Parties’ own compliance or lack thereof.
208
E. Benefits of the UNIDROIT Convention for Developing Countries
While the UNESCO Convention focuses primarily on monitoring, the 
UNIDROIT Convention is directed at the restitution process. While repat-
riations have been successfully achieved under the UNESCO Convention, 
as detailed above,
209
the UNIDROIT Convention attempts to fill gaps left by 
the UNESCO Convention by “reduc[ing] illicit traffic in cultural objects by 
expanding the rights upon which return of such objects can be sought, and 
by widening the scope of objects subject to its provisions.”
210
The 
UNIDROIT Convention establishes a restitution procedure in domestic 
courts, one with a low burden of proof for countries of origin, and without 
reservations, creating a uniform system.
Although the UNIDROIT Convention is not costless, it does attempt to 
create processes that will benefit developing countries more than the default 
domestic court procedures that would exist without it. Like the UNESCO 
Convention, the UNIDROIT Convention does not create an international 
dispute resolution body, but, as mentioned above, the UNIDROIT Conven-
tion does explicitly authorize member states to petition the courts of other 
States Parties for the return of cultural property, and it establishes proce-
dures for this.
211
As discussed more below, if an object is found to be of sig-
nificant cultural importance to the requesting state, the courts of the recipi-
ent State Party must order its return.
212
There are no examples of UNIDROIT, or domestic implementing legis-
lation, being directly invoked to successfully recover cultural property. 
However, there are examples of UNIDROIT-like procedures being success-
fully utilized in cultural property recovery. While the United States is not a 
State Party to the UNIDROIT Convention, it does have a similar cultural 
property protection regime through a series of bilateral agreements.
213
The 
domestic court procedures established by that system have successfully re-
208. See Folarin Shyllon, The Recovery of Cultural Objects by African States Through 
the UNESCO and UNIDROIT Conventions and the Role of Arbitration, 5 UNIFORM L. REV.
219, 225–26 (2000). 
209. See supra notes 168–169 and accompanying text.
210. Harold S. Burman, International Institute for the Unification of Private Law 
(UNIDROIT): Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of the Draft 
UNIDROIT Convention on the International Return of Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural 
Objects, 34 I.L.M. 1322, 1322 (1995).
211. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 10, art. 5(3).
212. Id. Article 5 also includes other cases in which a court shall return the stolen cultur-
al property, but the “significant cultural importance” clause is the broadest category. 
213. See generally Howard N. Spiegler & Yael Weitz, The Ancient World Meets the 
Modern World: A Primer on the Restitution of Looted Antiquities, 1 CULTURAL HERITAGE &
ARTS REV. 43 (2010). 
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turned cultural property or prompted out of court settlements,
214
highlighting 
the potential benefit of the UNIDROIT Convention’s domestic court proce-
dures.
Another benefit of the UNIDROIT Convention is that the burden of 
proof in UNIDROIT restitution cases is low. A State Party source country 
can require return of an object if its removal is found to significantly impair
the physical preservation of the object or its context . . . the integri-
ty of a complex object . . . the preservation of information of, for 
example, a scientific or historical character . . . the traditional or 
ritual use of the object by a tribal or indigenous community, or [if 
the State Party] establishes that the object is of significant cultural 
importance for the requesting state.
215
What constitutes a “significant” impairment is left undefined by the 
UNIDROIT Convention,
216
creating a flexible standard to be liberally in-
voked by source countries. Once this standard is met, the UNIDROIT Con-
vention places a duty on the courts of the state where the possessor is locat-
ed to obtain custody of the object and send it back to its home country.
217
Thus, the UNIDROIT Convention attempts to diminish the costs for the 
country of origin to regain the lost object. In the absence of these 
UNIDROIT provisions, some recoveries would be even more costly or even 
impossible. By extending the source country’s reach to the possessor’s 
courts, the UNIDROIT Convention creates a greater benefit to developing 
countries.
The UNIDROIT Convention also prohibits reservations, creating the 
possibility for a uniform set of cultural property protection rules across the 
globe.
218
Though the black market in cultural property is global,
219
since 
most cultural property is sold to wealthier countries, poorer nations are the 
prime beneficiaries of these Convention commitments. Naturally, the 
strength of this international policing system grows as more countries sign 
on and accede to the Conventions. With a more uniform international sys-
214. Prominent examples include the Lydian hoard case and the Elmali hoard case. Re-
public of Turkey v. Metro. Museum of Art, 762 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Republic of 
Turkey v. OKS Partners, No. 89-3061-WJS, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17032 (D. Mass. June 8, 
1994).
215. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 10, art. 5(3). 
216. See id.
217. See id. art. 5.
218. See Alexandra Levine, Note, The Need for Uniform Legal Protection Against Cul-
tural Property Theft: A Final Cry for the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L.
751, 753 (2011). 
219. Ashleigh Tilley, ISIS, Blood Antiquities, and the International Black Market,
HUMAN SECURITY CTR. 1, (Feb. 1, 2016), http://www.hscentre.org/policy-unit/isis-blood-
antiquities-international-black-market. 
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tem of restitution, deterrence will increase, and the illicit cultural property 
market will suffer.
220
F. Shortcomings of the UNIDROIT Convention for 
Developing Countries
Although the UNIDROIT Convention does address and correct for 
some of the shortcomings of the UNESCO Convention, it is still far from 
perfect. Like the UNESCO Convention, the UNIDROIT Convention does 
not apply retroactively. Moreover, its statute of limitations restricts recov-
ery, and unknowing possessors of cultural objects are entitled to compensa-
tion for returning the objects to their rightful state owners. Its low number of 
signatories also undermines its effectiveness.
First, the UNIDROIT Convention, like the UNESCO Convention, is not 
retroactive. It applies only to cultural objects that are illegally exported after 
a state signs onto the Convention.
221
While non-retroactivity is the norm in 
international treaties, the inability to recover, or to seek recovery for, the 
large amount of cultural property taken through colonialism and imperial-
ism is problematic.
222
But, just as under the UNESCO Convention, this 
problem does not nullify the benefits of at least having restitution proce-
dures going forward.
In addition, there are time limits on when claims can be established un-
der the UNIDROIT Convention framework. First, and least objectionable, is 
the Convention’s primary statute of limitations, which creates a three-year 
window for a claim, starting when the country of origin knows the location 
of the cultural property and the identity of its possessor.
223
While this statute 
of limitations may not be unusual or necessarily overly problematic, the 
UNIDROIT Convention also states that claims can (almost) never be 
brought fifty years after a theft.
224
Thus, if an illicit purchaser successfully 
hides the cultural object for this fifty year period, it is no longer be recover-
able. The UNIDROIT Convention does carve out an exception for cultural 
objects that are an “integral part” of an identified monument or archaeologi-
cal site, for which only the three-year knowledge statute of limitations ap-
plies,
225
but this is subject to a further carveout that still allows recipient 
countries to opt-in to imposing a seventy-five year post-theft limit on 
220. See Eur. Parl. Ass., Report of the Comm. on Culture and Educ. art. I, ¶¶ 3–4, 3d 
Sess., Doc. No. 8001 (1998) (“The UNIDROIT Convention can however only develop its full 
effect, when the same number of states producing cultural property accede to it as states im-
porting cultural property.”).
221. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 10, art. 10.
222. Id.
223. Id. art. 3.
224. Id. art. 3(3). 
225. Id. art. 3(4). 
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claims.
226
Furthermore, if an object was exported in the fifty years following 
the death of its creator, it is not protected unless an indigenous community 
created it for traditional or ritual use.
227
This range of limitations on recov-
ery shrinks the breadth of restitution available under the UNIDROIT Con-
vention.
Perhaps the greatest issue, however, is that if the possessor should not 
reasonably have known that the object was stolen cultural property, he is 
entitled to the court-determined “fair and reasonable compensation” from 
the requesting state.
228
While not necessarily rising to the object’s purchase 
price, this compensation may include the costs of returning the object to its 
home country.
229
Placing this cost on source countries could dissuade them 
from pursuing claims.
230
Still, this language is self-limiting; the amount to be paid in exchange 
for the cultural object is only that which is “fair and reasonable,” and this 
compensation must only be paid if the possessor did not know or should not 
have reasonably known that the object was stolen.
231
Courts can also choose 
to include a due diligence standard for any award of compensation, which 
would heighten the possessor’s burden.
232
There is also an alternative to 
providing any compensation at all: Allowing the possessor to retain owner-
ship of the re-housed object or to transfer the ownership to someone resid-
ing in the object’s home country pursuant to an agreement with the request-
ing country.
233
While this does provide an alternative if countries cannot 
afford “fair and reasonable” compensation, it is not primed for cultural 
property protection, which makes it controversial.
234
Furthermore, though source countries benefit from the ability to bring 
suits, the UNIDROIT Convention does not adequately address the potential-
ly high costs of litigation or arbitration,
235
which may still be prohibitive if 
courts allocate even what might be considered a reasonable portion of the 
expenses to source countries.
226. Id. art. 3(5).
227. Id. art. 7.
228. Id. art. 6.
229. Id. art. 6(4). 
230. See, e.g., Lenzner, supra note 181, at 470 n.11 (stating that Lebanon backed out of 
a cultural property dispute due to litigation costs) (citing Sarah Jane Checkland & Andrew 
Pierce, Sevso Silver: Peer’s Win Leaves Rivals Smarting, TIMES (LONDON) 6 (Nov. 5, 1993)); 
The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects—An Over-
view, UNIDROIT (June 9, 2014), https://www.unidroit.org/overviecp/english [hereinafter 
1995 UNIDROIT Convention—An Overview].
231. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 10, arts. 4(1), 6(1). 
232. IRINI A. STAMATOUDI, CULTURAL PROPERTY LAW AND RESTITUTION: A
COMMENTARY TO INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND EUROPEAN UNION LAW 100 (2011). 
233. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 10, art. 6(3); see also STAMATOUDI, supra
note 232, at 100–01.
234. STAMATOUDI, supra note 232, at 101.
235. See, e.g., Lenzner, supra note 181, at 470 n.11.
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At present, the UNIDROIT Convention’s strength is severely undercut 
by its low number of signatories. Unlike the UNESCO Convention, the 
UNIDROIT Convention has not been adopted by most of the world. As of 
December 2019, only fifty-eight states had signed the Convention, and only 
forty-eight had implemented it.
236
Both major markets for the cultural prop-
erty trade, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, and source 
countries, such as Egypt and Turkey, have not signed.
237
But despite this 




This note was an attempt to show the problems arising from the illicit 
trade in cultural property and to offer the best available solution. While de-
veloping countries’ accession to the UNESCO and UNIDROIT Conventions 
alone will not solve the problem of the illicit cultural property trade entirely, 
and options for improved future multilateral agreements remain, the protec-
tions provided by the Conventions remain an accessible and underutilized 
option. Signing onto these Conventions can help states build their tourism 
industries, preserve their cultural heritage, and combat crime.
In particular, in the absence of another instrument with stronger protec-
tions or another mechanism for the restitution of cultural property, increased 
ratification of the UNESCO and UNIDROIT Conventions would grant 
source country States Parties the enforcement benefits of the import regula-
tions and domestic court systems of market country States Parties. Further-
more, these Conventions would be better able to combat the illicit trade in 
cultural property if their memberships increase. Moreover, accession to 
these Conventions does not impose substantial costs on the potential mem-
bers and the provisions of the Conventions are indeed made to benefit de-
veloping countries specifically in many ways. In addition, since the Conven-
tions are not retroactive, there is an incentive for States Parties to sign onto 
them sooner rather than later.
Finally, it is worth restating that signing these agreements would not 
constrain member states from contemplating alternative mechanisms with 
greater protections. Member states could still enter into bilateral treaties 
236. UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects (Rome, 
1995)—Status, supra note 117. The signatories are Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, 
Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, China, 
Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, France, 
Gabon, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Hungary, Iran, Italy, Laos, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, North Mace-
donia, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Slo-
vakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tunisia, and Zambia.
237. See id.
238. See Lenzner, supra note 181. 
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with more stringent commitments and protection mechanisms.
239
Moreover, 
countries could still adopt stricter domestic regulations. For example, Tur-
key adopted a complete ban on the exportation of any antiquities from the 
country.
240
And a future or additional international agreement, as contem-
plated above,
241
could be applied in combination with the UNESCO and 
UNIDROIT Conventions. Indeed, when it was drafted, the UNIDROIT 
Convention was meant to extend the scope of the existing UNESCO Con-
vention,
242
suggesting that future improvements are not outside of the spirit 
of these two Conventions. Therefore, accession to these Conventions is a 
ready, underutilized option for developing countries to better protect their 
cultural property.
239. For example, the implementing legislation for the UNESCO Convention in the 
United States, the Cultural Property Implementation Act (“CPIA”), enforces the limits that 
appear in the UNESCO Convention, such as on artifacts taken from museums. Convention on 
Cultural Property Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2613 (2018). But it also states that 
no cultural property listed in bilateral agreements between the United States and another coun-
try can be imported into the United States. Id. § 2604.
240. Law on the Conservation of Cultural and Natural Property, Law No. 2863 arts. 13, 
23, 32, Resmi Gazette [R.G.] 23 July, 1983, No. 18113 (Turk.).
241. See supra notes 113–120 and accompanying text.
242. 1995 UNIDROIT Convention—An Overview, supra note 230.
